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INTRODUCTION
The concept of “the standard of care” is often discussed 
among physicians, and yet the legal definition of this term is 
frequently not understood. Emergency physicians are on the 
front lines of medicine and are frequently involved in medical 
malpractice cases. It is estimated that 7-17 malpractice claims 
are filed per 100 physicians every year.1,2 States vary in the 
number of these claims that result in payment (Table 1).3 
Thus it is important to know how the legal system defines 
the standard of care, and to what standards we as physicians 
are being held. A chronological approach to the evolving 
definition of the standard of care through legal history will 
help to understand the current concept and nuances of the 
term.
Negligence, in general, is legally defined as “the standard 
of conduct to which one must conform… [and] is that of a 
reasonable man under like circumstances.”4 In law, medical 
malpractice is considered a specific area within the general 
domain of negligence. It requires four conditions (elements) 
be met for the plaintiff to recover damages. These conditions 
are: duty; breach of duty; harm; and causation. The second 
element, breach of duty, is synonymous with the “standard 
of care.” Prior to several important cases in the 1900s, the 
standard of care was defined by the legal concept of “custom.” 
As quoted in the 1934 case of Garthe v. Ruppert, when 
“certain dangers have been removed by a customary way of 
doing things safely, this custom may be proved to show that 
[the one charged with the dereliction] has fallen below the 
required standard.” 5 Put another way, if others in the business 
are commonly practicing a certain way that eliminates 
hazards, then this practice can be used to define the standard 
of care. A jury still needed to decide, however, whether this 
“custom” was reasonable and whether the deviation from this 
“custom” was so unreasonable as to cause harm.
EARLY LEGAL CASES: THE BAD NEWS
Two cases changed the legal definition of the standard of 
care as it is applied in medical malpractice law today. The first 
case had nothing to do with medicine, but rather a tugboat. 
The case of The T.J. Hooper in 1932 helped to alter how the 
legal profession thought about custom and the standard of 
care. In this case, the owner of the tugboat T.J. Hooper was 
sued for the value of two barges. The tugboat had been caught 
in a storm and the two barges it was transporting sunk. The 
Table 1.  Tne worst paid malpractice claims per state per year.
State Paid claims per 1000 physicians
Louisiana 21.8
Montana 21.6
New Mexico 18.9
Oklahoma 18.3
New York 17.3
Puerto Rico 17.1
South Carolina 16.1
Pennsylvania 15.5
Mississippi 14.2
Kansas 13.9Western Journal of Emergency Medicine  110  Volume XII, no. 1  :  February 2011
owners of the barges charged that the T.J. Hooper was unsafe 
for duty at sea as it did not have a radio receiver to review 
important storm warnings. In addition, they charged that it 
was “customary” for tugboats to have this radio receiver. They 
claimed that if the T.J. Hooper had a radio, they could have 
been warned of the storm and avoided it. In reviewing the 
case during appeal, Justice Learned Hand ruled in favor of 
the barge owners; however, he did not do so based on custom. 
He indicated that it was not in fact customary for tugboats to 
be outfitted with the receivers, but that since the practice was 
reasonable, the owners of the T.J. Hooper could be help liable 
for damages. He stated, “In most cases reasonable prudence is 
in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; 
a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of 
new and available devices. It never may set its own tests, 
however persuasive be its usages. Courts must in the end say 
what is required; there are precautions so imperative that even 
their universal disregard will not excuse their omission.” 6 In 
other words, if there is a practice that is reasonable but not 
universally “customary” it may still be used as a measure of 
the standard of care.
The case of The T.J. Hooper set the stage for an important 
trial in medical malpractice that occurred in 1974. In the 
case of Helling v. Carey, the plaintiff (Helling) sued her 
ophthalmologist (Carey) for the loss of her eyesight due to 
glaucoma. The defendant won both during the original trial 
and the appeal, but when the case made it to the Supreme 
Court of Washington State the verdict was overturned in favor 
of the plaintiff. During the initial trials, the expert witnesses 
indicated that as the patient was under the age of 40 and the 
incidence of glaucoma in this group was only one in 25,000, 
that it was not the standard to test patients under 40 with 
tonometry. The Supreme Court decided, however, that the test 
was inexpensive and harmless, and should have been offered 
to the patient. Justice Hand’s decision in The T.J. Hooper case 
was quoted in the decision.7
The case of Helling v. Carey set a worrisome precedent 
for medical malpractice cases. The court essentially ruled 
that even though the customary practice at the time was 
followed, the physician was still liable. They cited the case 
of The T.J. Hooper and also referenced a decision by Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes in 1903 that stated ,”what usually 
is done may be evidence of what ought to be done, but 
what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable 
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not.” 8 
These two cases legally established that while great weight 
is given to customary practices with regard to the standard 
of care, custom is not the definitive factor in determining 
negligence. In essence, the two cases suggest that what is 
commonly done (i.e. custom) may not be enough, and that 
there are some things that may not be standard, but are 
still reasonable for the physician to perform. Unfortunately 
for the physician, these cases suggest it is up to the legal 
profession and the jury, and not the medical profession, 
to decide what is “reasonable” and “unreasonable.” In 
fact, subsequent studies have found that Helling v. Carey 
has changed the practice of offering tonometry to all 
patients with subsequent increase in cost and no change in 
morbidity.9 Following the ruling in Helling v Carey, there 
was an outcry from physicians. The medical profession as a 
whole seemed to be asking, “How much is enough?”
The ruling in Helling v Carey prompted state legislatures 
to pass statutes that defined the standard of care in their 
jurisdiction. The state of Washington was the first to pass this 
type of legislation, when they stated that the standard of care 
is not met when “the defendant or defendants [fail] to exercise 
that degree of skill, care and learning possessed by other 
persons in the same profession…”10
 
MODERN CASES: THE GOOD NEWS
The good news for practicing physicians is that in more 
recent cases there appears to be an effort to ensure that jurors 
understand that the standard of care does not mean perfection 
in practice. While old cases in law tend to be more powerful 
as they have stood the test of time, these more recent cases 
help show a trend toward keeping jury expectations realistic.
In the 1985 case of Hall v. Hilbun, a patient (Mrs. Hall) 
presented to her physician for abdominal pain. Dr. Hilbun, a 
general surgeon, was consulted and operated on the patient 
for a small bowl obstruction. He observed the patient in the 
recovery room and left for the night. Details from the case 
indicate that there were abnormal vital signs, and Mrs. Hall 
had pain throughout the night, but Dr. Hilbun was not notified. 
She died of respiratory failure in the morning. During the 
night, Dr. Hilbun had been notified about another patient, but 
he did not check up on Mrs. Hall. In addition, his orders never 
indicated for what things he should be called by the nursing 
staff. Initially he won the case because the testimony of two 
witnesses that discussed the national standard of care for a 
surgeon was excluded. On appeal, however, Dr. Hilbun was 
found liable as their testimony was allowed. Even though the 
physician lost in this case, the court’s discussion was very 
important in defining the standard of care in the modern era. 
Chief Justice C.J. Robertson stated:
“Medical malpractice is a legal fault by a physician 
or surgeon. It arises from the failure of a physician to 
provide the quality of care required by law. When a 
physician undertakes to treat a patient, he takes on an 
obligation enforceable at law to use minimally sound 
medical judgment and render minimally competent 
care in the course of services he provides. A 
physician does not guarantee recovery… A competent 
physician is not liable per se for a mere error of 
judgment, mistaken diagnosis or the occurrence of an 
undesirable result.” 11
 
In this case, Dr. Hilbun did not provide “minimally 
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competent care,” but the good news from a physician’s 
standpoint is that the law only requires “minimal 
competence.” The care does not even have to be “average,” 
which makes sense; otherwise, 50% of all medical care 
would be malpractice by definition.
A second case with similar outcomes occurred in 1995. 
In the case of McCourt v. Abernathy the physicians again 
lost due to their substandard care. Mrs. McCourt presented 
for several complaints over the course of three days but was 
found to have an infection on her finger from a pin stick 
while working in manure. Over the course of these three 
days, she was seen by Dr. Abernathy and his partner Dr. 
Clyde who simply cleaned the wound. When she became 
increasingly ill, they gave her oral antibiotics, but she 
subsequently became septic. An internist who was consulted 
diagnosed septicemia, and the patient died despite aggressive 
care. Again, the physicians acted below the standard of care, 
but the trial judge gave an important set of instructions to the 
jury. He stated:
“The mere fact that the plaintiff’s expert may use a 
different approach is not considered a deviation from 
the recognized standard of medical care. Nor is the 
standard violated because the expert disagrees with 
a defendant as to what is the best or better approach 
in treating a patient. Medicine is an inexact science, 
and generally qualified physicians may differ as to 
what constitutes a preferable course of treatment. 
Such differences due to preference…do not amount to 
malpractice.
I further charge you that the degree of skill and care 
that a physician must use in diagnosing a condition 
is that which would be exercised by competent 
practitioners in the defendant doctors’ field of 
medicine….
Negligence may not be inferred from a bad result. 
Our law says that a physician is not an insurer of 
health, and a physician is not required to guarantee 
results. He undertakes only to meet the standard of 
skill possessed generally by others practicing in his 
field under similar circumstances.”12
Again, the judge re-enforced that the care provided by a 
physician be minimally competent, may differ from the care 
of other physicians and that a bad outcome does not mean that 
the standard of care was not met.
A final case that helped define the modern definition of 
the standard of care is Johnston v St. Francis Medical Center 
from 2001.13 In this case, a 79-year-old male who presented 
with abdominal complaints was evaluated with radiographs 
and labs, but his examination was equivocal. Two physicians 
examined him during the course of the day and found him to 
be in mild distress. Additional studies to include computed 
tomography and ultrasound were ordered, but the patient 
became hypotensive and was sent to the intensive care unit 
(ICU). The ICU physician thought he might have an aortic 
aneurysm, which was confirmed during laparotomy. The 
patient died in the operating room. The plaintiffs argued that 
the physicians should have diagnosed the aneurysm earlier. 
All of the experts, except one, in the case indicated this was a 
difficult diagnosis. The court ruled in favor of the physicians. 
More importantly however; the court made it clear that while 
the aneurysm was obvious on radiograph and labs once the 
diagnosis was made, hindsight can not be used for evaluating 
the conduct and judgment of the physician. In this case the 
diagnosis of aneurysm was “possible” but difficult enough 
that missing the diagnosis did not amount to not providing the 
standard of care. This is in sharp contrast to the prior case of 
Helling v. Carey.
CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES AND THE 
STANDARD OF CARE
A brief discussion on the use of clinical practice 
guidelines (CPG) as defining the standard of care is warranted. 
Extensive reviews of the subject are available for the 
interested reader.9,14-16 Several court cases have addressed the 
use of CPGs, and currently there is no set standard for how 
these documents are used in court cases. Some courts allow 
more liberal use of the CPGs, and others require more scrutiny 
as to the scientific validity of the CPG before it is admitted. 
Normally a document like a CPG would be considered 
“hearsay” in the courts , as the author is not available to testify 
or to allow for cross-examination. However, the court cases 
dealing with CPG use have suggested that if the guidelines are 
of some scientific validity, that they may be used as “learned 
treatises” and bypass the hearsay rule. CPGs may be used 
to lend credence to an expert witness, to impeach an expert 
witness, to defend a physician for following the document as 
the standard of care, or to suggest physician deviance from 
the document as deviance from the standard of care. In the 
end, an explanation by an expert as to why a CPG is indicative 
or not indicative of the standard of care goes a long way in a 
court case. When one side uses a CPG in a court case, it is up 
to the opposing side to ensure that the jury is given adequate 
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Table 2. Historical development of the Standard of Care
Initial Definition
  Based on custom
That which is typically done is what is considered stan-
dard
The 20th Century Definition (Helling v. Carey; The TJ Hooper)
That which is customarily done plus anything that seems 
reasonable even if not typically done
The Modern Definition (Hall v. Hilburn; McCourt v. Abernathy; 
Johnston v. St. Francis Medical Center)
That which a minimally competent physician in the same 
field would do under similar circumstancesWestern Journal of Emergency Medicine  112  Volume XII, no. 1  :  February 2011
explanation as to why this may or may not actually represent 
the standard of care. This is a continually evolving topic and is 
currently dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Now recognizing 
the complicated issues that arise with formulation of CPGs, 
it would seem optimal that committees who develop these 
guidelines should allow flexibility, include multiple sources 
of scientific merit, and not be dependent on the opinion of a 
relatively small panel. In addition, if clear evidence is sparse, 
this should be openly acknowledged in the formation of the 
guideline.
SUMMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In conclusion, the concept of the standard of care has 
evolved over the years and will continue to change as legal 
theory in this area develops. Hopefully this will allow for 
increased certainty and clarity, which is the stated goal of 
all laws. The bad news is that there are several important 
cases where the suggestion is that even if a practice is not 
the standard, if it is reasonable, a physician can be found 
culpable for not pursuing that course of action. The good news 
for physicians is that in more recent cases the courts have 
frequently upheld that the standard of care is what a minimally 
competent physician in the same field would do in the same 
situation, with the same resources. These recent cases also 
note that bad outcomes are to be expected, and all entities 
can not be expected to be diagnosed. Finally, clinical practice 
guidelines are being used more frequently in court cases as 
support for the standard of care; however, their acceptance and 
uses are continually changing and decided on a case-by-case 
basis (Table 2).
Emergency physicians should be aware of these landmark 
cases that define the standard of care. In addition, physicians 
should be familiar with the content of various clinical 
practice guidelines so that one may practice by them, or 
document reason for deviating from them. Each state will also 
have statues that define malpractice in very specific terms. 
Physicians should review the relevant laws based on the state 
they practice in. By practicing with these concepts in mind, an 
emergency physician can feel more confident in daily practice, 
and when faced with a malpractice action. With this basic 
knowledge, the physician facing a suit may be able to assist 
his legal team in optimizing his/her defense.
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